Canada at COP27: Are We Still “Back”?


By Christopher Campbell-Duruflé

Carbon Canada
Zahra Hirji and Akshat Rathi, Justin Trudeau Defends Canada’s Minuscule Climate Progress, Bloomberg Green, October 20, 2022

Canada was an early supporter of the Paris Agreement, adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2015. The Prime Minister famously declared on the eve of the negotiations: “Canada is back, my friends. Canada is back, and here to help”. Seven years later, as state delegates meet again from 6 to 18 November 2022 in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt to monitor the Agreement’s implementation, whether Canada is still back is a question that looms heavy. As recently reported by Bloomberg Green, our country had the highest increase in CO2 emissions since 1990 in the G-7 and its per capita emissions are second only to Saudi Arabia within the G-20.

These trends jar with Canada’s latest pledges under the Paris Agreement, namely to reduce yearly emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) between 40 and 45% below 2005 levels by 2030, and to reach net-zero by 2050. At the 2005 baseline, our emissions were at the all-time high of 739 Mt of GHG. This equates to 739 million tons of CO2 equivalent, or roughly 739 million one-way flights over the Atlantic by one person that year alone. By contrast, Canada has pledged to reach 440 Mt in 2030 and then to continue decreasing, rapidly, to reach net-zero by 2050.

One may wonder how the notion of “net-zero” differs from “zero” emissions. The Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act defines net zero in Section 2 as meaning that any remaining emissions in 2050 could be “balanced” by removals from the atmosphere. Put simply, a removal can happen either by expanding natural carbon sinks such as Canada’s forests and wetlands, or by using technologies that can capture carbon from the atmosphere, most of which are still under development.

Canada’s poor climate performance and reputation as a “climate laggard” raise three questions with regard to how this country approaches net-zero.

  1. How many tons of GHGs are we really planning on emitting in 2030?

Is Canada planning on emitting 440 Mt for that year alone, or are we bracing for more and hoping to balance exceeding emissions with removals by natural sinks and carbon capture technologies? How much more? Canada’s latest pledge under the Paris Agreement includes a projection of 468 Mt in 2030. This suggests that it will be necessary to remove 28 Mt that year alone if no new mitigation policies are introduced.

Yet certain assessments are even more pessimistic. In 2021, Climate Action Tracker rated Canada’s policies and action as “Highly Insufficient” to achieve its targets. This independent research organization also warned that emissions in 2030 could be as high as 688 Mt -opening up a vertiginous gap of 248 Mt.

Canada's Overall Rating
Climate Action Tracker, Canada Overall Rating, September 2021 Update.

2. Will Canada fill the domestic action gap with new policies and actions or by purchasing emissions removals from other countries?

The Paris Agreement allows a country like Canada to purchase emissions removals achieved in other countries and to deduct these from its own inventories. Specifically, Article 6(2) allows countries to purchase emissions removals from one another and Article 6(4) deals with corporations purchasing removals to offset their own environmental impact.

In 2022, the 2030 Emissions Reduction Plan: Canada’s Next Steps for Clean Air and a Strong Economy confirmed Canada’s interest in purchasing GHG removals from other countries. The plan does not indicate, however, to what extent this option will be relied on to reach 440 Mt in 2030:

While Canada’s actions to date have focused on emissions reductions measures within Canada, there is also the potential to support international action through ‘internationally transferred mitigation outcomes’ (ITMOs). ITMOs offer the possibility of emissions reductions at a lower cost, while contributing to sustainable development abroad. The Government of Canada will continue to explore the possibility to leverage international and domestic offsets to support Canada’s climate objectives. (p. 99)

I argue that greater clarity is needed regarding how Canada intends to fill the domestic action gap. Under the Paris Agreement, purchasing emissions removals is not meant to allow countries to coast on emission pathways that would lead the world to 4 °C of warming and to purchase their way to net-zero. Article 6 is meant to foster ambitious action through international cooperation and, under the rules adopted last year in Glasgow, Canada will have to report every two years on how purchasing removals contributes to achieving the Paris Agreement’s goals. My hope is that we seize these occasions to have public debates about how much Canada intends to rely on other countries to reach 440 Mt in 2030 and net-zero in 2050.

3. Will Canada avoid funding projects that harm local communities when purchasing emissions removals from other countries?

The very notion of purchasing emissions removals from other countries raises major challenges. The recent Land Gap Report warned that the land necessary to satisfy all countries’ current climate pledges under the Paris Agreement amounts to 1.2 billion hectares. This area equates to the totality of the world’s cropland and using it for reforestation and other forms of land-based removals would seriously compromise global food security.

Multiple projects linked to the international purchase of emissions under the Kyoto Protocol have attracted criticism for causing human rights violations, often in the context of land disputes with local communities. These projects include the Aguan biogas recovery from a palm oil mill project in Honduras, the Olkaria IV geothermal power project near Maasai villages in Kenya, and the Barro Blanco hydroelectric dam in Panama. In this last case, the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous peoples observed that the project promoters did not adequately consult the Ngobe-Bugle Indigenous people, as a result of which at least two members were killed and women were raped during demonstrations in 2012. Yet, the project led to the sale of over 66,000 tons in emission credits that were purchased internationally for approximately USD 12,000.

Barro Blanco Dam, Panama
Barro Blanco Dam, Panama. Credit: Agustín Abad, retrieved from Rainforest Rescue.

Many proposals were made to prevent this problem from continuing under the Paris Agreement. Regrettably, negotiators only agreed on creating a weak right to appeal decisions of the Supervisory Body in charge of monitoring the international purchase of emissions based on Article 6. Amnesty International warned that a scheme devoid of sufficient environmental and human rights safeguards amounts to a “hollow and unacceptable substitute for real zero emissions targets.”

In this context, I argue that Canadians have a heightened responsibility to ensure that any international purchase of emissions removals (by governments, corporations, and individuals) does not fund projects that violate human rights, displace Indigenous peoples from their territories, and sidetrack sustainable development in host countries. Again, the federal government will have to report biennially on how its purchase of emission removals minimizes environmental, economic, and social impacts. It is up to all of us to demand that Canada repudiate any form of carbon colonialism.

Canada will be at COP27, well represented by its Environment and Climate Change Minister, its Ambassador for Climate Change, parliamentarians, and civil society organizations such as Indigenous Climate Action. But is Canada still “back” in the way it appeared to be in 2015, as a trustworthy negotiation partner that would follow through on its international commitments? Greater clarity regarding how Canada will reduce its emissions to 440 Mt in 2030, limit its reliance on the international purchase of removals to a strict minimum, and prevent adverse impacts on global food security and local communities are basic conditions that remain to be satisfied.

Christopher Campbell-Duruflé

Christopher Campbell-Duruflé

Lincoln Alexander School of Law

Areas of Expertise: International law, environmental law, human rights, climate law, Inter-American human rights system, sustainable development, international relations

Assistant Professor Campbell-Duruflé teaches class actions law at the Lincoln Alexander School of Law. His research focuses on the role of international law in responding to some of the most pressing challenges of our time. He has published on the negotiation of the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change, appeared before the Senate during the study the Canadian Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act, and supported discrimination and Indigenous rights litigation within the Inter-American system. He is a Fellow of the Cambridge Centre for Environment, Energy and Natural Resource Governance (C-EENRG) and a member of the C-EENRG Research Series editorial team, and serves on the legal committee of the Centre québécois du droit de l’environnement.

Peace as a Fundamental Human Right is Long Overdue


By Chile Eboe-Osuji

“Peace is the most important global public good. … War brings death, human suffering and unimaginable destruction.” —Antonio Guterres

In the observation in the above epigram, the UN Secretary-General sets up the zero-sum value of war relative to peace. It should not be a profound observation in the 21st century. But, there it is: still sounding so profound. And that says so much about the human condition.

In my view, the invasion of Ukraine occurred partly because the international community has not managed—or resolved—to make wars of aggression sufficiently risky (at the personal level) for the world’s war lords.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine should change that calculation. This can be done by enhancing the legal hazards of war: not only at the more familiar level of criminal prosecution, but also at the level of civil liability that remains largely beyond our consciousness. Both strategies are easy enough to design—but their realisation depends only on the political will of the international community.

I shall presently discuss how to enhance the legal hazards of aggressive war to their authors and accomplices, from the angles of both criminal and civil liability.


Perhaps we may begin the discussion by asking whether this enhancement of the legal hazards of war should be done now. And – – why now?

Why now? It is because we have an overwhelming outrage against a war of invasion, fueling feelings that compel us to do something against wars of aggression. But, we don’t know what to do. Some governments have frozen assets, wondering what to do with them.

Armed conflict has been the greatest driver of the growth of international law.

There’s always the temptation for some to see something of a salutary relationship between war and civilisation—in this case international law. According to that view, war becomes a chief enabler of international law.

But I prefer to see the matter from the perspective of the struggle between a boa constrictor and its prey. Once the boa constrictor wraps itself around its prey, the constrictor tightens grip with every movement the prey makes. That’s what international law does to war.

Some may see that as perhaps too optimistic a view of international law. But consider this:

  • 1648:—Peace of Westphalia often seen as the recognisable yeast of contemporary international law. It resulted from the 30-years and the 80-years wars in Europe that spanned the period 1568 and 1648.
  • 1856:—Paris Declaration often seen as the first international instrument that sought to codify both the principle of neutrality and the proscription of privateering or mercenary activities during war. It resulted from the Crimean War of 1853 to 1856.
  • 1863:—The Lieber Code that was the first attempt to codify the essential elements of the law and customs of war at an early stage. It resulted from the American Civil War.
  • 1864:—The 1st Geneva Convention resulted in the creation of the Red Cross Society and the recognition of the need to provide care and succour to sick and wounded soldiers. It followed the brutality of the 2nd Italian War of Independence that Henry Dunant (a Swiss businessman) witnessed in the Battle of Solferino in 1859.
  • 1868:—St Petersburg Declaration was the first international instrument that sought to make war more humane. It indicated the principle that the weakening of the enemy—rather than total annihilation and wanton cruelty—is the only legitimate aim of war; and it laid down the principle against use of weapons that inflict unnecessary suffering that would make peace more difficult to achieve. The Declaration resulted from the discovery of munitions that would inflict unnecessary suffering.
  • 1899 and 1907:—There were, of course, the extensive international law instruments that resulted from the First and the Second Hague Peace Conferences, respectively in 1899 and 1907. They resulted from the many wars that had blighted life in Europe.
  • 1919:—The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 produced the Versailles Treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations. The former (in article 227) laid down the unprecedented idea that Heads of State could be prosecuted before international tribunals as a requirement of international law, with no scope at all for the plea of sovereign immunity. The latter instrument introduced for the first time the idea of a standing international organisation with universal remit, to try and foster peace between nations and limit their inclination to make war. The achievements resulted from World War I.
  • 1945:—The conclusion of World War II gave the world the following developments amongst others:
    • The Charter of the International Military Tribunal for Nuremberg and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, which not only unequivocally recognised aggressive war as a crime in international law, but similarly clearly confirmed that Heads of State and Heads of Government may be prosecuted before an international tribunal as a requirement of international law, and that the plea of immunity does not apply.
    • The creation of an updated version of a standing international organisation—the United Nations—to replace the League of Nations.
    • The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in recognition for the first time that human beings are beneficiaries of rights conferred directly upon them by international law.
    • A new international crime—genocide—was nominated for concerted global action in the eponymous Convention on the Punishment and Prevention of the Crime of Genocide.
    • The twin project of formulating an international code of crimes and creating a permanent international criminal court to enforce that code.
  • 1991 to 1994:—Balkan Wars and the Rwandan Civil War resulted in the UN Security Council’s creation of two ad hoc international criminal tribunals—for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. In doing so, the United Nations reiterated the norm that Heads of State are not immune to prosecution before an international tribunal.
  • The events in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda also inspired renewed impetus for the creation of a permanent international criminal court that eventually produced the International Criminal Court. A further by-product of the events in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda was the development of the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). It insists that sovereignty entails much more than a vaunting right for the State. It also entails for the State an obligation to protect the domestic population, which if not discharged, would justify intervention coordinated by the United Nations.

The foregoing is a non-exhaustive outline of how armed conflict has enabled the growth of international law.


And here we are in 2022. Another wretched war (waged by Russia against Ukraine), turbo-charging global rage against wars of aggression, which not only visit death and destruction upon innocent victims but also general hardships on the world at large.

It is best to not waste the energy generated by that rage. The better strategy would be to channel all that rage into a productive outcome. It should occasion another adjustment to international law. This is in the manner of enhancing the legal risks—criminal and civil—in ways that must perturb the lords of war.


Currently, the Rome Statute and the ICC comprise the only standing global mechanism against international crimes in general, and the crime of aggression in particular.

There is much more that can be done from the perspective enhancing the risk of criminal prosecution for the crime of aggression. This involves amending the Rome Statute in the following ways:

  • Cover the gap that exists in article 15bis(5), which now excludes persons (or territories) of non-ICC member States from the aggression jurisdiction of the ICC unless the UN Security Council refers the situation to the ICC Prosecutor for investigation and prosecution. That gap can be covered by deleting article 15bis(5), given the fact that the use of the veto power will obstruct the Security Council from referring a situation to the ICC when a P5 member or its client State is implicated in the conduct that needs to be referred to the ICC.
  • Open up article 13(b) of the Rome Statute and allow not only the Security Council, but also the General Assembly (when the veto power has been immorally used to obstruct the Security Council) to refer situations to ICC Prosecutor. Under the amended arrangement, the General Assembly could be left free, at the barest minimum, to recommend such referral to UN Member States—using the “Uniting for Peace” procedure, thus allowing ICC to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the specific General Assembly resolution to that effect; and
  • Allow the inculpation of not only persons in a position to direct the military or political actions of a state, but also lower-level persons, so they too can be prosecuted for the crime of aggression. This will encourage rank and file soldiers to refuse to obey orders to fight wars of aggression. Thus putting pressure against any Head of State of Government that may conceive of a war of aggression.

These amendments need not be made as a package. Beginning with the first recommendation as the easiest to make, any of the other two or both will immensely enhance the risk of criminal liability for the crime of aggression. It will add layers of deterrence against the crime.

And the great prospect of enhancing that risk through the amendments is that it is entirely up to the member States of the Rome Statute to resolve to make the indicated amendment. It requires no input from the United Nations, let alone a veto power from any member of its Security Council.


Beyond enhancing the hazard of criminal prosecution as indicated above, the strategy of suppressing future crimes of aggression will be significantly shored up by directly exposing aggressive warlords—and their accomplices—to the risk of personal civil liability, universally.

This can be accomplished in the specific manner of adopting an international covenant that specifies peace as an actionable fundamental human right.

As will become clear, this is one strategy that can be employed to enforce international law directly by means of national law and domestic legal processes, a valuable strategy that compensates for the weakness of international law in self-execution.

The scheme of the new treaty can be arranged as follows.

It will begin with the declared premise that all peoples, nations and persons (natural or legal) have a fundamental and inalienable right to peace. That premise will then be the basis of prescribing the acts which would amount to breach of the right to peace. Those acts would obviously include: (i) acts of aggression as defined and explained in the United Nations General resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974; (ii) the launching of sustained internal violent conflict or acts of terrorism by any group of persons in violation of international law; and (iii) complicity or aiding and abetting the conducts indicated in (i) and (ii) above, including by furnishing material assistance to any such conduct.

It won’t be enough to stop at declaring a fundamental right to peace and indicating what would amount to a violation of that right. In light of the doctrine expressed in the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium, it will be necessary to spell out the consequences of such a violation. Here, it will be necessary to provide for a right to reparation, and the modalities of actualising it. The right to reparation would be given to all peoples, nations and persons (natural or legal) who suffer damage as a result of a breach of their right to peace. The right to reparation may be claimed against any person (natural or legal), entity, government or state responsible for the breach or aids and abets it.

The forum for the claim would be any existing or future multilateral, regional or national court or human rights adjudicatory body with jurisdiction to make the award of reparation contemplated in the new covenant. In that regard, each State Party to the covenant should be required to undertake such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over claims of reparation contemplated in the covenant, especially when the asset or property of the parties and accomplices to any breach of the right to peace is located within the State. This is how national laws and domestic legal processes will be used to enforce international law in this particular respect.

Additionally, State Parties to this new covenant will be required to cooperate in the execution of any judgment of reparation against any asset or property of any State or person or their accomplices found liable for a breach of the right to peace, wherever such assets or property may be found; without regard to considerations of sovereign immunity.

It is in these circumstances that the earlier question of what to do with frozen assets answers itself. Those assets can remain frozen pending the determination of the claims of victims of wars of aggression. The frozen assets can be used to satisfy those claims.


Past efforts to recognise the right to peace ran into opposition from powerful States concerned that the right to peace may be construed in a manner so broad as to impinge upon the right of States to individual or collective self-defence. Businesses engaged in arms manufacture and trade have also been concerned about the implications of such a right to their commercial interests. 

The imperfections of life must commend a sensible compromise. To begin with, there is no intrinsic incompatibility between the fundamental right to peace and the right of a State to individual or collective self-defence as recognised in international law. The latter includes the right of a State to avail itself of appropriate industry, methods or means of self-defence. That is to say, the right to peace does not stand against the interests of corporations who manufacture and sell weapons that will enable states to engage in self-defence.

But, what the right to peace will—and does need to—stand against would be the selfish interests of businesses inclined to continue to replenish the ways and means of aggressive wars, by selling weapons and other means of perpetuating an act of aggression, when they ought to know that the weapons and means they provide are being used to further acts of aggression.


As we speak, there remains substantial room for the growth of international law in ways that will constrain the space for wars of aggression as a pernicious global phenomenon. Beyond the bleakness of the invasion of Ukraine, the resulting possibility for the development of international law in the suggested way represents a silver lining. The negative global passion unleashed against that war should be harnessed into a positive force for good, as had happened in past wars that occasioned the growth of international law.

The enhancement of the risks against wars of aggression beyond criminal liability, especially by accentuating the strategy of civil claims will make wars of aggression personally costly to the pocketbooks of the authors and accomplices of wars of aggression. The outcome will be to give those culprits further food for thought on whether they truly need to wage a particular war of aggression.

Note: This is the revised summary of a lecture delivered at Stanford University Law School on 10 May 2022.

Chile Eboe-Osuji

Dr. Chile Eboe-Osuji

Chile Eboe-Osuji is the Distinguished International Jurist at the Lincoln Alexander School of Law and Special Advisor to the President. He served as the President of the International Criminal Court in The Hague, from 11 March 2018 to 11 March 2021, and a judge at the Court from 2012 to 2021.

Before the ICC, he worked in various capacities at the UN, including as the Legal Advisor to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva, and as a senior prosecution counsel at both the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. He practised law as barrister in Canada and Nigeria. He is a recipient of the Goler T Butcher Prize of the American Society of International Law, the Honorary Patronage of the Philosophical Society of Dublin College, and an Honorary Doctor of the University of Middlesex. He received his LLB from the University of Calabar (Nigeria), his LLM from McGill University, and his PhD from the University of Amsterdam (the Netherlands).  

He has written and lectured extensively on international criminal law, international humanitarian law and international human rights law.